Lefebvre dismisses meter as an disciplining, commodifying, and homogenizing principle of modern capitalism. Rhythm, on the other hand, is its organic antidote. To him, the most typical manifestation is not music – since it is still connected to instruments – but the human body, which Lefebvre conceives as a bundle of rhythms. Each organ has its own rhythm, but these rhythms can only exist in relation to those of the other organs: polyrhythmia. Eurhythmia is the term that Lefebvre introduces for a healthy bundle of rhythms. Arrhythmia is a state of crisis in which the synchronization between the organs fails to occur. There is either harmony or crisis, but nothing in between. According to Lefebvre, rhythm can never be single, it is always a multiplicity.
Apart from the fact that the human body offers the best example of rhythm, Lefebvre also connects rhythm to the organic through the concept of cyclicality. He argues that the cycles of nature counter, and compensate for, the rigid, disciplining meter of work, politics, and technology. Nature versus culture: an all-too-familiar conflict. Lefebvre does not make much of an effort to hide his own preference:
”The study of everyday life has already demonstrated this banal and yet little-known difference between the cyclical and the linear, between rhythmed times and the times of brutal repetitions. The repetition is tiring, exhausting and tedious. while the return of a cycle has the appearance of an event and an advent. Its beginning, which after all is only a recommencement, always has the freshness of a discovery and an invention.” (Lefebvre and Régulier 73)
While the constant change of linearity is exhausting, the periodic return of cyclicality is revitalizing. Despite the normative language that Lefebvre uses to describe these two concepts of time, he maintains that they should not be understood as binary opposites. Linearity and cyclicality are inextricably linked; they are two perspectives that one can maintain in relation to one and the same process. While the moment of return produces the effect of cyclicality, the periodic repetition of the same moment produces a series. Linearity and cyclicality are not really opposites, but come together in a third concept: rhythm. Rhythmanalysis dissolves this age old dichotomy… and, according to Lefebvre, all other binary oppositions as well.
Coming from a Hegelian/Marxist background, it is no surprise that Lefebvre incorporates rhythm into a dialectic schema. In this schema, rhythm is always positioned in-between polar opposites, such as melody and harmony, difference and repetition, internal and external measure, space and time. Although Lefebvre does not mention this opposition explicitly, the combination of change and return in cyclical motions, would easily fit in this series of contradictions. In all of these cases, rhythm is seen as a third and equal element that forms a triadic constellation with the other two.
“Triadic analysis distinguishes itself from dual analysis just as much as from banal analysis. It does not lead to a synthesis in accordance with the Hegelian schema. Thus the triad ‘time-space-energy’ links three terms that it leaves distinct, without fusing them in a synthesis” (Lefebvre 12)
Lefebvre criticizes the fact that Hegel stresses synthesis over thesis and antithesis, and tries to correct this, by removing the hierarchy between the three terms. His modification of dialectics – rhythmanalysis – is not dual but triadic.
In Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis, the first two terms of the triad are variables. Every binary opposition can take their place. The third term, however, is a constant: rhythm. Despite its multiple manifestations – just to mention a few: secret rhythms, public rhythms, fictional rhythms, dominating-dominated rhythms – this constant is primarily defined negatively. Rhythm finds its determination in relation to the other two terms. The triad schema of dialectics not only equalizes but (presumably unintentionally) also homogenizes. All the different forms of rhythm eventually have to fit in this straightjacket. They are restricted by their function as mediator, and therefore not really all that different from each other. In every manifestation thinkable, this “concrete universal” (45) has to oscillate periodically – but not necessarily regularly – between two polar opposites. In Lefebvre’s modification of Hegel’s dialectics, rhythm replaces matter – which is actually spirit – as the dividing and connecting force behind the phenomena.
“Everywhere where there is interaction between a place, a time and an expenditure of energy, there is rhythm.” (15)
To Lefebvre, rhythm is much more than a musical or esthetic phenomenon; it is a universal, organizing principle. Confronted with all these grand, totalizing schemes and gestures, however, it is easy to oversee that rhythmanalysis actually erases its own point of departure: syncopation. While Lefebvre starts from the irreducibility of rhythm to a regular pattern, it actually ends up as the only constant in the triad. Rhythmanalysis cannot deal with syncopation. The structure fully annihilates the (possibility of an) event. Rhythm ends up as meter.
Rhythmanalysis proves to incapable of solving the question that ignited it: What makes rhythm different from meter? Rhythm itself is the solution that rhythmanalysis proposes, but this is, of course, begging the question. To be fair,the vicious circle does not really bother Henri Lefebvre. To him, cyclicality and rhythm are inextricably linked anyway. Moreover, rhythmanalysis seems to be more concerned with the problems of time, space, and everyday life than with rhythm itself. Rhythm is more a concept that explains, and less a principle that needs to be explained.
Nevertheless, as a science that aspires to explain and describe rhythm, Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis falls short. In my opinion, it suffers from the following two flaws:
1. Lefebvre makes rhythm into a universal principle. Rhythm thereby loses all its specificity and it cannot be further explained. Rhythmanalysis can analyze everything but rhythm itself.
2. Lefebvre declares continuity as the desirable state of rhythm. Consequently all elements that presuppose an element of discontinuity – novelty, innovation, disruption, displacement – are treated as unwanted dangers. But precisely these elements distinguish rhythm from meter. By avoiding interruptions, rhythmanalysis transforms rhythm into meter.
Lefebvre turns rhythm into a universal “perpetuum mobile”. Syncopation would be the logical solution to break this vicious circle, but this is an answer that the philospher cannot accept. In that case, he would need to introduce at least one extra term into his triads. Syncopation or dialectics: confronted with this dilemma the philosopher unfortunately opts for the latter. As a result, rhythmanalysis can only define an abstract and general concept of rhythm. Making it plural and specific would mean the end of his triadic schema. Lefebvre, fully aware of this problem, tries to go around it as follows:
”Is the origin of the procedure that starts with generalities found in abstractions? No! In the field of rhythm, certain very broad concepts nonetheless have specificity: let us immediately cite repetition. No rhythm without repetition in time and in space, without reprises, without returns, in short without measure. But there is no identical absolute repetition, indefinitely. Whence the relation between repetition and difference. When it concerns the everyday, rites, ceremonies, fêtes, rules, and laws, there is always something new and unforeseen that introduces itself into the repetitive: difference.” (6)
While this explanation might seems plausible at first sight, it actually reproduces the same problem with different concepts. If absolute repetition does not exist and every cycle introduces something new, would not every occurrence of meter inevitably also be a rhythm?
”Moreover, the region of truth is not to be sought in that matter which is missing in logic, a deficiency to which the unsatisfactoriness of the science is usually attributed. The truth is rather that the insubstantial nature of logical forms originates solely in the way in which they are considered and dealt with. When they are taken as fixed determinations and consequently in their separation from each other and not as held together in an organic unity, then they are dead forms and the spirit which is their living, concrete unity does not dwell in them. As thus taken, they lack a substantial content — a matter which would be substantial in itself. The content which is missing in the logical forms is nothing else than a solid foundation and a concretion of these abstract determinations; and such a substantial being for them is usually sought outside them. But logical reason itself is the substantial or real being which holds together within itself every abstract determination and is their substantial, absolutely concrete unity. One need not therefore look far for what is commonly called a matter; if logic is supposed to lack a substantial content, then the fault does not lie with its subject matter but solely with the way in which this subject matter is grasped.” (Hegel 48)
2 Comments
Eerlijk gezegd ken ik, als musicus, geen mede-musicus die het tellen van de maat verwart met het weergeven van een ritme — commentaar op citaat Lefebvre.
Verder boeiend stuk, tot zover.
Wow, what an in-depth analysis of the rhythm of a song!
I never considered trying to put something like this into words.