The fact that this extremely short abbreviation of Aristotle’s biography does not contain any real information clearly expresses Heidegger’s disregard of the genre. All personal details are intentionally left out in his version. Heidegger does not mention the fact that Aristotle was born in 384 BC in Stagira as the son of a doctor, nor does he pay any attention to the fact that the ‘Stagirite’ was the tutor of Alexander the Great before the latter became the king of Macedonia and a merciless imperialist. Even the philosopher’s years as a student at Plato’s Academy are of no importance to his distant German successor. In fact, as long as we assume that thinking is not the prerogative of academic philosophers, Heidegger’s sentence could be the biography of any other person that ever lived.

Heidegger’s portrayal of Aristotle’s biography, however, is more than mere mockery. The implicit assumption that underlies this parody, is that philosophy should only be concerned with a person’s thoughts and not with his actions. In the – heavily edited – transcription of the above mentioned lecture, Heidegger transforms his refusal to elaborate on Aristotle’s life into a maxim:

“Regarding the personality of a philosopher, the following is of interest: He was born than and than, he worked and died. The ‘Gestalt’ of the philosopher, or something similar, will not be given here.”(Heidegger 2002:5)

In this view, the person has nothing to do with the thinker; or, a bit less radical, there is no need to pay attention to the life of the former because all the philosophically relevant elements are already present in the writings of the latter.

Heidegger’s categorical rejection of biography entails a normative definition of the practice of philosophy. Aristotle, as well as any other philosopher, should be judged solely on the basis of his work and not on the contingent facts and anecdotes that surround it. In Heidegger’s view – and I dare to claim that for once the little magician from Meßkirch speaks for the majority of his peers – biography has no value in philosophy.

Implicitly, Heidegger’s normative definition of his academic practice also works the other way around. If philosophy is only concerned with a person’s theoretical thoughts, there is no need for the individual thinker to be overly concerned with everyday life either. A philosopher’s life takes place in an abstract, conceptual realm. His only responsibility are his ideas. All moral, aesthetic, and practical issues are ultimately meaningless distractions that need to be overcome. A philosopher should dedicate – preferably even sacrifice – his entire life to his thoughts.

Martin Heidegger’s denial to acknowledge the relevance of biographical contingencies for philosophy is ironic to say the least. His name is inseparable from a controversial biographical event: his Nazi engagement and presumed anti-semitism. There is large corpus of academic studies that discusses to what degree Heidegger works are influenced by these biographical events, and a substantial subset that argues that it is entirely contaminated by the fascist ideology.

Without entering these moral, political and psychological debates, I dare to claim that it indisputable that there is a strong relation between the crucial events in Heidegger’s biography and the decisive turns in his philosophy. In my opinion, the philosopher’s life had a direct, almost measurable impact on his thinking. To give a detailed analysis of the reciprocal relation between Heidegger’s philosophy and biography, however, exceeds the goals and limitations of this essay. For present purposes. it suffices to briefly mention two of the most obvious cases:

1. In 1933, Martin Heidegger’s enthusiasm about the person Adolf Hitler, and his wife Elfride’s enthousiasm about the National Socialistic Party (Safranski ..), led the philosopher to accept the rectorate of the university of Freiburg. This new stage in his career almost immediately found a reflection in the concept of ‘leader’ (Führer) that he develops in his acceptance speech The Self-Assertion of the German University (1983). This concept, however, was completely absent and even inconsistent with the existentialist philosophy of Being and Time (1927).

2. Twelve months later, Heidegger’s resignation and subsequent disappointment with the Hitler and the National Socialistic movement resulted in an ever-growing scepticism about the possibilities of human action altogether. A development in Heidegger’s thinking that culminated in his so-called “Letter on Humanism” (1946) and his so-called ‘second’ magnum opus Contributions to Philosophy (1989).

In order to fully comprehend – or reject – Heidegger’s philosophy, it seems crucial to take such events into consideration. In my opinion, the important and often sudden turns in the philosopher’s thoughts – which have been heavily debated amongst Heidegger scholars – cannot be explained solely on the basis of his writings. It is neither possible nor preferable to ignore the influence of such biographical contingencies on his philosophy altogether. Heidegger’s own life story shows that the harsh line that he drew in order to separate thought from life needs to be softened.